Amid disclosures of mass surveillance and government hacking, the Snowden revelations have exposed a hitherto unknown branch of the British intelligence services dedicated to influencing human behaviour with psychological science. Reporting has focused on the political implications of the revelation, but the leaked files also give a fascinating insight into new methods deployed by the secret services. The Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group, or JTRIG, specialises in attempting to “discredit, disrupt, delay, deny, degrade, and deter” opponents and has been branded by the press as GCHQ’s “deception unit”.
Controversially, not only were terrorists and hostile states listed as opponents who could pose a national security threat, but also domestic criminals and activist groups. JTRIG’s work seems primarily to involve electronic communications, and can include practical measures such as hacking computers and flooding phones with junk messages. But it also attempts to influence people socially through deception, infiltration, mass persuasion and, occasionally, it seems, sexual “honeypot” stings. The Human Science Operations Cell appears to be a specialist section of JTRIG dedicated to providing psychological support for this work.
What stands out from the leaks is that the intelligence services don’t seem to have any secret in-house psychological research they rely on. Or at least they didn’t in the early 2010s when the leaked documents were written. One presentation describes a series of “gambits for deception”, all of which seem to be taken from well-known published research on a mix of persuasion, relationship formation, scams, and, curiously, stage-magic psychology.
Indeed, JTRIG’s “10 principles of influence” include some taken from persuasion research by psychologist and bestselling author Robert Cialdini. These include the reciprocity principle – giving something to encourage the person to owe you something, and the social compliance principle – where people are more likely to do something that they believe people are already doing. Others come directly from research on how scammers con their targets, such as making the scam tempting but sufficiently illegal so that the victim can be pressured to keep quiet with the threat of disclosure.
The Human Science Operations Cell clearly loves the idea that its staff are “magicians of persuasion”, and it refers to them in similar terms throughout, but the science doesn’t really doesn’t fit the hype. Although the cell draws on genuine research in this area – for example, a study by psychologist Susana Martinez-Conde and pickpocket Apollo Robbins, looking at what sorts of movements are most likely to distract you – this applies poorly when trying to influence people online. In fact, the whole presentation is rather light on practical guidance, giving the impression of a summer project for an over-enthusiastic doctoral student.
Not every effort, however, is so flimsy, as a leaked 2011 report by Mandeep Dhami, professor of decision psychology at Middlesex University, reveals. She interviewed JTRIG operatives and made recommendations for how behavioural science could help with deception and infiltration. According to her online CV, Dhami was on secondment to the intelligence services when the report was written, although she’s clearly not an insider, suggesting that the systematic application of behavioural science to covert operations is probably a relatively new enterprise for GCHQ. But unlike the makeshift approach described in the deception presentation, Dhami’s report is thorough, competent, and wide-ranging, though again based entirely on publicly available research.
It’s a problem she was evidently aware of, pointing out that most studies have been conducted on a small subset of people from western cultures – typically white, middle-class people, easily accessible to researchers. By contrast, intelligence services spread their efforts on people around the globe and the report recommends that the intelligence services develop their own research programme on personality profiling, crime prevention and internet-specific behaviour-change strategies, which it would be fair to assume is now in progress.
The leaks are interesting as a snapshot into the early stages of a much wider trend in managing security threats: the increasing use of psychology and behaviour-focused operations with the internet as a key battleground. Earlier this year, the British Army announced the creation of the 77th Brigade, which combines psychological and media operations, as well as civil-military operational units geared to stabilise areas of conflict as part of their remit to “[lead] on Special Influence Methods”. At the time, the press dubbed them “Twitter troops”, but expertise in online influence seems increasingly important now, given the online grooming efforts of Islamic State and the central role of internet propaganda in the Ukraine conflict.
Military strategists now talk about “hybrid” or “unrestricted” warfare, where military powers use physical force only occasionally against a background of constant cyber attacks and psy-ops. You can bet the intelligence services are prioritising research to test the most effective ways of influencing people – and their relationships — over the internet.