Case studies in complexity (part 1): TECHAPPs, SYSTECHs, and aircraft complexity

This article is part 1 of a series featuring case studies in complexity from the work of RealKM Magazine’s Bruce Boyes.

Background

• No. 1 Technologist Apprentice Course. My experiences with complexity began more than 40 years ago, when I finished high school and became part of the very first intake¹ of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Technologist Apprentices (TECHAPPs) in 1982 (Figure 1).

• Response to increasing complexity and integration in aircraft systems. The TECHAPP scheme and associated Systems Technician (SYSTECH) trade group were introduced as part of a Technical Trade Restructure (TTR)² initiated in response to increasing complexity and integration in aircraft systems:

The introduction of the TTR was based upon a perception that continuing increases in aircraft complexity were exposing shortcomings in the training system’s ability to provide personnel with adequate fault diagnosis skills. Exacerbating this situation was the increased level of avionics integration of the newer aircraft, which blurred the lines of demarcation between the aviation trades as they were defined at the time.

Why it’s complex

• Complex vs. complicated. In a highly cited paper³ in the Journal of Knowledge Management, Dave Snowden asserts the following distinction between complex and complicated systems: “An aircraft is a complicated system; all of its thousands of components are knowable, definable and capable of being catalogued as are all of the relationships between those components. … [On the other hand], Human systems are complex; a complex system comprises many interacting agents, an agent being anything that has identity.” In a later blog post⁴, Snowden further states that “The complex and complicated distinction is not owned by Cynefin. Paul (Cilliers) famously used it with the illustration of an aircraft (complicated) and a mayonnaise (complex) to make the point. Since then it is in common use.” Cilliers however is actually not the original source of this analogy, because he himself states that⁵ “I have heard it said (by someone from France, of course) that a jumbo jet is complicated, but that a mayonnaise is complex.”
• Reductionist thinking. The view that an aircraft is complicated rather than complex is dangerous reductionist thinking. The reality is that aircraft don’t operate by themselves. They are intrinsically connected to humans – aircrew, ground crew, and maintenance staff – through complex interactions. As discussed in the first part of the RealKM Magazine series “Getting to the heart of the problems with Boeing, Takata, and Toyota,” those complex interactions are at the heart of aircraft system design, particularly interactions with the aircrew⁶. This means that the relationships between aircraft components that Snowden asserts are “knowable, definable and capable of being catalogued” in fact inextricably include the human systems that Snowden asserts are complex. As discussed in the second and subsequent parts of the RealKM Magazine series on Boeing, Takata, and Toyota’s knowledge failures, if Boeing’s hyped but fatally flawed knowledge management (KM) strategy had recognised this reality then the 346 people who died in the Boeing 737 MAX crashes could still be alive today.

Approach

• Intensive and extensive training. The TECHAPP training was intensive and extensive. It first involved three years of training at both Footscray College of Technical and Further Education (TAFE) and the RAAF School of Radio, followed by two years of practical experience.  After the five years of training and practical experience, a Certificate of Technology (Electronics) was awarded. My practical experience was gained with the RAAF’s No. 1 Squadron, working on F111 aircraft which were at the time the most significant and complex aircraft in the RAAF’s fleet (Figure 2 and header image).

Outcomes

• Unintended consequences. While the TECHAPP scheme effectively addressed a complex aircraft systems issue, its introduction caused unintended consequences, thrusting us into a complex social situation that we then had to try to navigate⁷:

whilst the resultant injection of diagnostics capability was the result desired, the lack of understanding of how best to employ and integrate these new tradesmen, and an impression that they should have some kind of special status, engendered resentment and uncertainty amongst their peers. There was a belief amongst tradesmen (including many of the TECHAPPs themselves) that these new ‘super techs’ would be fast-tracked to become SYSTECHs, gaining an unfair advantage and threatening the promotion prospects of their peers.

• Program changes. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) would later stop training technicians to the depth and breadth of TECHAPPs, and instead shift the emphasis to on-the-job competency development. However, this approach also brought its own array of complex problems⁸.

Lessons

• KM not practicing what KM preaches. Knowledge management (KM) promotes improved access to and use of knowledge. However, the view that aircraft systems are complicated rather than complex has been promoted in KM when the origin of this notion is “someone from France, of course” rather than known people with a demonstrated knowledge of aircraft systems. This is knowledge-siloed thinking. The KM community should instead be embracing a wider range of knowledge through transdisciplinarity⁹. This inludes accessing a wider range of knowledge in regard to complexity such as the four Overseas Development Institute (ODI) complexity papers that have been serialised in RealKM Magazine. These papers provide what is arguably the most comprehensive research-based guidance in existence in regard to how to respond to complexity. The four ODI article series are Exploring the science of complexity¹⁰, Planning and strategy development in the face of complexity¹¹, Managing in the face of complexity¹², and Taking responsibility for complexity¹³.
• Leaders attempting simple changes in a complex social context. The TECHAPP scheme had been proposed and championed by a senior RAAF officer who hadn’t realised that an apparently simple change in a complex social context can bring about unexpected consequences¹⁴.
• Valuable personal knowledge. After a nine-year engagement with the RAAF, I left to pursue an emerging and growing interest in environmental management and heritage conservation. The seeds of knowledge I gained from my both intended and unintended grounding in complexity would prove to be valuable in these new fields. Environmental management and heritage conservation are highly contested issues, with a diverse array of stakeholders having a wide range of different and often conflicting perspectives in regard to what should be done and how it should be done. The way in which each stakeholder approaches the issue will be influenced by their wider frame of knowledge and interactions. This creates a socially complex context for decision-making, and in the case of environmental conservation, this social complexity interfaces with the ecological complexity of natural ecosystems which compounds the overall complexity.

Header image: No. 1 Squadron RAAF detachment to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, USA, 1985. Bruce Boyes marked in image copy.

References:

Also published on Medium.